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Abstract
After the seminal work of Nickell (1981), a vast literature demonstrate the inconsistency
of "conditional convergence" estimator in income based dynamic panel models with fixed
effects when the time horizon (T ) is short but the sample of countries (N) is large. Less
attention is given to the economic root of inconsistency of the fixed effects estimator when
T is also large. Using a variant of the Ramsey growth model with long-run adjustment
cost of capital, we demonstrate that the fixed effects estimator of such models could be
inconsistent when T is large. This inconsistency arises because of the long-run adjustment
cost of capital which gives rise to a negative moving average coeffi cient in the error term.
Income convergence will be thus overestimated. We theoretically characterize the order of
this inconsistency. Our Monte Carlo simulation demonstrates that the size of the bias is
substantial and it is greater in economies with higher capital adjustment costs.
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1. Introduction
In the empirical economic growth literature, a typical specification of an income
based dynamic panel econometric model is (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Ch.
11, pp.462):




ln yit−1 + xitλ+ ηi + uit (1)
where yit is the income of the ith cross section unit at date t; xit denotes a 1 × J
vector of control and interest variables; λ is a J × 1 parameter vector; ηi represents
the fixed effects (FE) and uit is the random disturbance term. The parameters β and
λ summarize the list of parameters to be estimated. In the convergence literature,
β > 0 is the crucial parameter of interest because it measures the coeffi cient of condi-
tional convergence known as β-convergence. Such a concept is used to understand the
convergence of countries or regions conditional on certain fundamentals.1 A higher
value of β indicates a faster rate of conditional convergence among the regions or
countries studied.
Dynamic panel models with fixed effects have been widely employed in the liter-
ature for studying convergence among group of countries (e.g., Islam, 1995, Caselli
et al., 1996 and Ho, 2006). In his seminal work, Nickell (1981) points out that fixed
effects (FE) estimator of dynamic panel models is inconsistent when T is short but
N is large but consistent when T →∞.2
1See, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch. 11).
2A sizable econometric literature investigates the nature of this FE bias and possible remedies
in dynamic panel data models. For instance, following the work of Nickell (1981), Kiviet (1995),
2
The present paper demonstrates the existence of economic roots that could lead
to the FE bias in long-time dynamic panel models. In particular, in income based
FE dynamic panel estimation, the convergence coeffi cient β could be inconsistent in
the presence of an economic primitive such as capital adjustment cost even when T
is suffi ciently large. Such an adjustment cost by causing a sluggish adjustment of the
capital stock in response to an idiosyncratic productivity shock could give rise to a
negative moving average term in the error process resulting in a correlation between
the lagged dependent variable and the error term.3 The empirical evidence abound
that such adjustment cost of capital is present (Chirinko, 1993 and Hamermesh and
Pfann, 1996).
The novelty of the paper lies in identifying an economic fundamental such as
capital adjustment cost as a factor contributing to inconsistency of a well known
estimator. Although there is a proliferation of econometric literature suggesting
possible remedies for inconsistency, little attention is given in the literature in un-
derstanding the economic root behind the inconsistency in a dynamic FE regression.
Our paper is an attempt in that direction.
The issue of inconsistency due to the presence of capital adjustment cost is not
Judson and Owen (1999) and Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) examine this bias in short and long
dynamic panel FE models. Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and
Bond (1998, 2000) and Bond (2002) provide a handy way to correct the FE bias in short-time
dynamic panel models applying internal instruments. However, these are also criticized as sensitive
to "instrumental proliferation" (Roodman, 2009).
3Pesaran and Smith (1995) point out that inconsistency in the dynamic panel estimator can
arise if the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. They also point out that
the standard corrections for serial correlation are unlikely to work because of the complexity of the
error process. We demonstrate the error process can have a negative MA term due to the existence
of an economic fundamental such as capital adjustment cost.
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entirely uncommon in the literature. Caballero (1994) establishes that the OLS
estimate of wealth elasticity to adjustment cost generally tends to be inconsistent in
a small sample when capital adjustment cost is present in the model. He does not,
however, explore the implication of capital adjustment cost for FE bias. To the best
of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt in the literature to understand the
role of capital adjustment cost as an economic fundamental driving the inconsistency
of convergence estimator in dynamic panel models with long time horizon.
To demonstrate our key point, we develop a standard Ramsey growth model with
a convex capital adjustment cost function. Such an adjustment cost function means
a rising marginal cost of investment. While diminishing returns to capital facilitate
the process of convergence, a rising marginal cost of investment schedule slows it
down. The usual dynamic panel FE regression model fails to factor into this capital
adjustment cost and thus it overestimates the rate of convergence. We show this
formally by establishing that the income based dynamic models has a negative first
order moving average error when capital adjustment cost is present. A negative cor-
relation between the lagged dependent variable ln yit−1 and the disturbance terms uit
in (1) makes the convergence coeffi cient inconsistent. In a multivariate context, we
show that the effi ciency of all coeffi cient estimators are affected by this inconsistency
when the adjustment cost of capital is present.
We derive an analytical expression for the inconsistency employing the Ramsey
growth model with a capital adjustment cost technology. A well known parametric
form for the adjustment cost function is borrowed from Lucas and Prescott (1971)
that was subsequently used by Basu (1987), Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) and Basu
4
et al. (2012). Such a capital adjustment cost differs from the investment adjustment
cost (e.g. Christiano et al., 2005) in the sense that the adjustment cost persists even
in the long-run. This explains why inconsistency arises even for infinite time horizon
(T →∞). Our Monte Carlo experiment shows that inconsistency increases with the
degree of the adjustment cost of capital and it is quantitatively substantial.
In the next section, we develop a Ramsey-type growth model with heterogeneous
countries in terms of initial wealth, tastes and productivity to characterize the in-
consistency due to the adjustment cost. Section 3 reports a Monte Carlo simulation
to demonstrate the sensitivity of the FE bias to the adjustment cost. Section 4
concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Preference and technology
Consider a sequence of infinitely-lived heterogenous representative citizens for
each country, i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., ∞ where i stands for the country
representative4 and t stands for time. Countries are heterogenous in terms of (i)
initial capital stock (ki0), (ii) preference (discount factor, ρi) and (iii) idiosyncratic
productivity shock (ξit).
5 We let the preference parameter ρi vary across countries
which could give rise to country specific fixed effects. Also, assume that cross country
productivity shocks are iid. Households are further assumed to be both consumers
4Alternatively, i could represent a country in the world economy whereas each country is repre-
sented with a single representative consumer, as in Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
5Variables with(out) subscript i represent individual (economy-wide) values. Variables without
subscripts t and i represent economy-wide steady-state values.
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and entrepreneurs.6
The production function facing the ith country resident is Cobb-Douglas with











j=1 χj = 1 (3)
where qit is the gross output of the ith country, kit is the country’s capital stock at
period t and ki0 is given. gijt represents the jth exogenous input in the production
function (such as infrastructure or a learning-by-doing knowledge spillover that could
potentially give rise to technological externality, in the spirit of Arrow, 1962) that
is specific to the ith country condition. In addition, mit is a flow of imported inter-
mediate inputs that the country finances by borrowing from the international credit
market at a fixed interest rate, r∗. The ith country agent treats gijt as given while
choosing consumption and investment. The production technology thus exhibits pri-
vate diminishing returns to reproducible input kit, imported intermediate input mit
and the exogenous inputs gijt but aggregate constant returns to scale, (similar to
Romer, 1986 and Barro, 1990).7
The ith country borrows mit at the start of each period and fully pays off the
loan with interest rate at the end of each period. The optimal purchase of imported
intermediate input thus satisfies the condition:
6See Angeletos and Calvet (2006) for a similar type of entrepreneurship.
7Barro (1990) models the production function at the individual firm level as a function of private
and public capital.
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∂qit/∂mit = 1 + r
∗ (4)
which gives rise to the following demand function for intermediate inputs,









which upon plugging into (2) and after netting out the loan retirement cost, (1 + r∗)mit,









εit ≡ (1− ϕ) (ϕ/ (1 + r∗))ϕ/(1−ϕ) (ξit)
1/(1−ϕ)
λj ≡ χj/ (1− ϕ)
α ≡ ω/ (1− ϕ)
The ith country agent maximizes her utility in accordance to the utility function,






; ρi < 1 (7)
subject to the budget constraint,
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cit + sit = yit (8)
where cit and sit represent consumption and saving, respectively.
Following Lucas and Prescott (1971), Basu (1987) and Basu et al. (2012), the
investment technology is given by the following specification:
kit+1 = kit (1− δ + sit/kit)θ (9)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1) are rate of depreciation and degree of adjustment cost
of capital (kit), respectively. If θ = 0, adjustment cost of capital is prohibitively high
to change the capital stock. However, if θ = 1, adjustment cost of capital is zero and
we obtain a standard linear depreciation rule. We focus on such capital adjustment
costs between these two extremes costs because it has important implications for the
reduced form process for the per capita income.
Supposing capital depreciates fully each period, we may rewrite (9) as:8
kit+1 = kit (sit/kit)
θ (10)
Applying standard methods of undetermined coeffi cient, the optimal policy func-
tions for the ith agent are simplified as follows, (see Appendix A for details of the
derivation),9
8We assume complete depreciation of capital for analytical tractability, without loss of generality.
Basu and Getachew (2014) show that depreciation cost has a trivial effect on convergence property.
9See also, Basu (1987) and Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) for a similar closed form solution.
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cit = (1− ψi) yit (11a)
sit = ψiyit (11b)
where
ψi ≡ θαρi/ (1− ρi (1− θ)) (12)
After substituting (6) and (11b) into (10), the optimal dynamic equation of capital










where γ ≡ 1 − (1− α) θ. Therefore, the optimal capital stock in period t + 1 for
country i is a function of the country’s current capital stock (kit), the idiosyncratic
shock (εit), time-dependent country specific exogenous factors (gijt) and a time-
independent country specific factor (ψi), and adjustment cost of capital θ.
2.2. Role of long-run adjustment cost in determining the bias
According to (13), the adjustment cost of capital (θ 6= 1) impacts not only the
dynamics of capital at the individual country level but also the steady-state capital.10
In this respect, it differs from investment adjustment cost as in Christiano et al.
10Note that in the present model, the country specific fixed effect arises solely due to differences
in the taste parameter ρi. A more general specification can allow for differences in technology which
we do not pursue here.
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(2005) which do not have such long run effects.11 In particular, we see below the
long-run variance of the capital stock is given by υ2θ2/ (1− γ2) where υ2 = var [ln εit],
which depend on the adjustment cost parameter θ.12 Thus the adjustment cost does
not disappear in the long-run when (θ 6= 1).
In the present context, this long-lasting nature of the adjustment cost is particu-
larly reflected on its effect on the idiosyncratic shock. First, this idiosyncratic shock
forms the disturbance term (uit) in an estimation equation (1). Second, the shock
relates to country’s contemporaneous income (6), which appears as a lagged vari-
able in dynamic panel regression models. Therefore, such effects of the idiosyncratic
shock will manifest as a source of inconsistency in the estimate of the lagged income
in (1).
Based on the production function (6), the log of income of the ith country at
date t is given by,
ln yit = α ln kit +
∑J
j=1 (λj ln gijt) + ln εit
= α ln kit + gitλ+ ln εit (14)
where git is 1×J vector of (exogenous) regressors, git ≡ (ln gi1t, ln gi2t, ..., ln giJt) and
λ ≡ (λ1, λ2, ..., λJ)′ is a J × 1.
Finally, applying (6) and (13) to (14), we obtain the following representation for
11See Groth and Khan (2010) for a specification of a general adjustment cost function which nests
capital and investment adjustment cost.
12Refer to Corollary 1 below for details of the derivation of the variance.
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the dynamic panel model:
ln yit = γ ln yit−1 +
∑J
j=1 λjxijt + ηi + uit (15)
where ηi ≡ αθ lnψi and,
xijt ≡ (θ − 1) ln gijt−1 + ln gijt (16a)
uit = ln εit − (1− θ) ln εit−1 (16b)
In vector form,
ln yit = γ ln yit−1 + xitλ+ ηi + uit (17)
where xit ≡ (xi1t, xi2t, ..., xiJt) is a 1×J , λ ≡ (λ1, λ2, ..., λJ)′ as xijt is defined in (16a)





Then, using the linear approximation that e−β ≈ 1− β one gets:
1− γ = β (18)
Thus, the higher the value of γ, the slower the convergence.
Eq. (17) is an ARMA (1,1) evolution of the income of the ith country which
looks similar to (1). It represents the true specification for the estimation model of
conditional convergence based on the Ramsey growth model with a non-zero long-run
adjustment cost of capital. Such adjustment cost can be seen as a permanent tax
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on capital imposed by the mother nature. The long-run impact of such idiosyncratic
shock (13) is responsible for the negative moving average disturbance term (uit) in
(17).
The income based dynamic panel regression model thus involves an error term
which is negatively correlated with the lagged dependent variable (ln yit−1). There-
fore, the dynamic panel estimators with FE γ are inconsistent, even when T →∞.
To see the order of inconsistency involved in the lagged income term, set λj = 0
for all j to simplify exposition. Then, the following Proposition and Corollary can
be stated for the univariate case:
Proposition 1. The inconsistency from the dynamic panel model with FE estimator
(γ̂) of the coeffi cient γ with respect to (17), when ∀j λj = 0, is given by:
p lim (γ̂) = γ +
[
(θ − 1) υ2/Ei var {ln yit−1}
]
(19)
where υ2 = var(εit).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 1. The size of the bias is given by
Φ ≡ (1− γ
2) (1− θ)
α2θ2 + (1− γ2)
. (20)
Proof. Using (14), when ∀j λj = 0, we can rewrite the denominator in (19) as,
Ei var [ln yit−1] = Ei var [α ln kit−1 + ln εit−1]




Ei var [ln kit−1] = Ei var [ln ηi + γ ln kit−2 + θ ln εit−2]
= γ2 Ei var [ln kit−2] + θ
2υ2 (22)
since ηi is fixed over time and cov(ln kit, ln εit) = 0. Next note from (13) that for
a generic ith country agent, limt→∞ var [ln kit−1] = var [ln kit−2] = υ2θ
2/ (1− γ2)
because 0 < γ < 1.13 Since α, υ2 and θ are the same for all i, all agents converge to
the same variance of the capital stock which implies






Substitute (21) into (19) after substituting (23) into the former to derive the closed
form solution for the degree of inconsistency.
Thus in the presence of capital adjustment cost in a growth model, the panel
estimator with FE of γ in (1) is inconsistent regardless of the time dimension of
the panel. This overestimates the conditional convergence. It is straightforward to
verify that this bias is greater in economies with a lower value of θ meaning a higher
adjustment cost. The inconsistency of the FE estimator is absent if there is no capital
adjustment cost (θ = 1).
13To see this, rewrite (22) as:
Ei var [ln kit] = γ
2T




















The inconsistency of the FE estimator arises due to a negative contemporaneous
correlation between ln yit−1 and ln εit−1. The size of this correlation is proportional
to the degree of adjustment cost (1 − θ). To get the (economic) intuition further
for such a negative correlation, let the ith country experience a positive TFP shock
(∆ ln εit−1%) at date t− 1. The optimal investment rule (11b) dictates that the ith
country resident’s contemporaneous investment rises by the same percent because the
elasticity of sit−1 with respect to εit−1 is unity. Such a blip in investment (∆ ln sit−1)
increases the current capital stock (ln kit) by only θ% (see 10). The remaining (1−θ)%
of the investment is lost due to the presence of the long-run capital adjustment cost.
This loss enters the error term in (17) with a negative coeffi cient (−(1− θ) ln εit−1).
The standard regression equation (1) ignores this negative correlation between ln yit−1
and ln εit−1. As a result, the estimate of γ will be inconsistent and, hence, the
"conditional convergence" will be overestimated.
In the multivariate case where ∃j λj 6= 0, the inconsistency in FE panel estimator
affects the estimators of all variables due to a correlation between lagged output and
exogenous technological variables. Proposition 2 below demonstrates this.
Proposition 2. The inconsistency from the dynamic panel model with FE estimator










p(θ − 1)υ2 (24)
where bit ≡ x̃it − x̃i, λ̃ ≡ (γ,λ′)′, p ≡ (1,0)′ and 0 is 1× J zero vector.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The last term in (24) is different from zero with a non-zero adjustment cost of
capital (θ 6= 1). Therefore, in the multivariate case the effi ciency of all coeffi cient
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estimators (17) are affected by the inconsistency when the adjustment cost of capital
is present. This happens because the lagged income is correlated with the exogenous
variables in the production function.
3. Simulation
In this section, we report the results of a Monte Carlo simulation based on our
ARMA(1,1) specification of the income process (15) to ascertain the quantitative
magnitude of the bias resulting from the capital adjustment. As in our model income
process (17), we allow the subjective discount factor ρi to vary across countries in the
range [0.9, 0.99] which is the source of the fixed effect. All other structural parameters
are assumed to be the same for all countries. The capital elasticity parameter α is
fixed at 0.9 which is higher than the conventional level of 0.36 with a view to target
a plausible rate of convergence. The higher value of α is not unreasonable in an open
economy context given the fact that α equals ω/(1−ϕ) which could be higher if the
share ϕ of foreign intermediate input is higher. In addition, Romer (1986) alludes
to a higher capital share estimate in view of the broad based nature of capital that
includes knowledge. The adjustment cost parameter is first fixed at a baseline level
of 0.2 which gives rise to a γ equal to 0.98 meaning a 2% conditional convergence
(see 18) which is in accord with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
For a fixed i, we take 10000 draws of TFP (εit) from an iid lognormal distribution
and pass it through the true ARMA (1,1) process (17) for income (normalizing the
initial income at the unit level) to generate draws of log yit. We take 1000 draws of
ρi from a rectangular distribution with the support [0.9, 0.99] to capture the fixed
15
Table 1: Sensitivity of the bias to alternative θ values
θ γ p lim (γ̂) Bias
0.2 0.98 0.5437 0.4363
0.4 0.96 0.7331 0.2269
0.6 0.94 0.8259 0.1141
0.8 0.92 0.8740 0.0460
1.00 0.90 0.90 0.0000
effects. The pooled estimator (B.8) as shown in the appendix is then computed for
suffi ciently large T and N . The bias (the difference between γ and γ̂) is about 0.44 for
the baseline case. The failure to include the adjustment cost could potentially give
rise to an overestimation of convergence by 44%. Table 1 illustrates the sensitivity
of the bias to alternative adjustment cost parameter values. The bias decreases in
economies with lower adjustment cost (higher θ). For no adjustment cost scenario,
the bias nearly disappears.
4. Conclusion
The economic fundamentals that could generate inconsistency in models have
rarely received any attention in macroeconometrics literature. Such inconsistency
could arise due to several economic fundamentals. We identify one such fundamental
in income based dynamic panel models which is the long-run capital adjustment
cost. Using a parametric form for such an adjustment cost technology in a standard
Ramsey growth model, we have demonstrated that the dynamic panel regression
with fixed individual effects gives rise to an inconsistent estimator of convergence
for an infinite time horizon. The inconsistency arises because of the presence of a
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negative moving average term in the error of the dynamic panel regression. The
inconsistency is larger in economies with a higher adjustment cost of capital which is
verified in a Monte Carlo simulation. The implication of this inconsistency is that the
FE estimator of the "conditional convergence" of countries or regions could seriously
overestimate convergence.
A future extension of this paper would be exploring remedy for this FE estima-
tor bias resulting from capital adjustment cost. Moreover, our analysis is based on
a specific functional form for the capital adjustment cost technology that admits a
closed form solution for the reduced form income process. Such a specific functional
form is employed to derive an analytical solution for the FE bias and show how it
depends on the capital adjustment cost. Future extension of our work would be to
take a more general adjustment cost specification which includes short run invest-
ment adjustment cost such as Christiano et al. (2005) and explore the inconsistency
implications.
Appendix
A. Optimal capital accumulation
The proof mimics Basu (1987). Write the value function for this problem as:










α − (kit+1/kit)1/θ kit
}
+ρi Et v(kit+1, εit+1, gi1t+1, ..., giJt+1)

where Et is the conditional expectation operator.
Conjecture that the value function is loglinear in state variables as follows:
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v(kit, εit) = π0 + π1 ln kit + π2 ln εit + π3
∑J
j=1 λj ln gijt
which after plugging into the value function
π0 + π1 ln kit + π2 ln εit + π3
∑J















π0 + π1 ln kit+1 + π2 ln εit+1 + π3
∑J
j=1 λj ln gijt+1
}
 (A.1)
Differentiating with respect to kit+1 and rearranging terms one gets:









which after plugging into (A.1) and comparing left hand and right side coeffi cients
of ln kit uniquely solves:
π1 = α/ (1− ρi(αθ + 1− θ))
which after plugging into (A.2) we get:









Note that the decision rule for the capital stock depends only on π1. The re-
maining coeffi cients, π0, π2 and π3 can also be solved by using the same method of
undetermined coeffi cients and one can check that they are also uniquely determined
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by π1.
B. Proof of proposition 1
First rewrite (17), when ∀j λj = 0, as:
ln yit = γ ln yit−1 + ηi + uit (B.4)
where uit is given by (16b). Then, rewrite (B.4) in a deviation (from individual
steady-state mean) form as follows to eliminate the unobserved individual hetero-
geneity (ηi):
ait = γait−1 + vit (B.5)
where
ait ≡ ln yit − ln yi and ait−1 ≡ ln yit−1 − ln yi−1 (B.6)
vit ≡ (θ − 1) (ln εit−1 − ln εi−1) + (ln εit − ln εi) (B.7)
For any z, ln zi ≡ (T − 1)−1
∑T−1
t=1 ln zit and ln zi−1 ≡ T−1
∑T
t=1 ln zit−1.
The FE estimator of γ is the pooled OLS estimator of the model (B.5),





















When T →∞, the terms in the right side of (B.8) can be rewritten as,
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p lim (γ̂) = γ +
∑N







where E(.) stands for the time expectation operator.
Substituting back (B.6) into (B.9), we obtain,
p lim (γ̂) = γ +
∑N
i=1 E [(ln yit−1 − E [ln yit−1]) ((θ − 1) ln εit−1 + ln εit)]∑N
i=1 E [(ln yit−1 − E [ln yit−1]) (ln yit−1 − E [ln yit−1])]
= γ +
∑N
i=1 cov ((ln yit−1, (θ − 1) ln εit−1 + ln εit) /
∑N
i=1 var [ln yit−1]
(B.10)
Note that from (6), cov(ln yit−1, ln εit) = 0.14 Thus, (B.10) becomes
p lim (γ̂) = γ + (θ − 1)
∑N
i=1 cov(ln yit−1, ln εit−1)/
∑N
i=1 var(ln yit−1) (B.11)
Then, substitute (6) into (B.11) to obtain,
p lim (γ̂) = γ + (θ − 1) cov(α ln kit−1 + ln εit−1, ln εit−1)/ var (ln yit−1)




i=1 var (ln yit−1) (B.12)
since kit−1 is predetermined and, hence, uncorrelated with εit−1 (see (6)).
Taking N →∞, (B.12) can be rewritten as:
14This is also refereed as sequential exogeneity (see Wooldridge, 2010, Ch. 10 & 11).
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p lim (γ̂) = γ + (θ − 1) Ei var(ln εit−1)/Ei var (ln yit−1) (B.13)
where Ei(.) represents the cross sectional expectation. Since var(ln εit−1) = υ2 is the
same for all i, Ei var(ln εit−1) = υ2.
C. The multivariate case
For the case ∃j λj 6= 0, first rewrite (17) as:
ln yit = x̃itλ̃+ ηi + uit (C.14)
where x̃it ≡ (ln yit−1,xit) is a 1× (J + 1) and λ̃ ≡ (γ,λ′)′ is a (J + 1)× 1 vector of
parameters.
Then, transform the equation in (C.14) to eliminate the fixed effects (ηi):
ait = bitλ̃+ vit (C.15)
where bit ≡ x̃it − x̃i.
Recall that:
21
ait ≡ ln yit − ln yi (C.16a)
vit ≡ (θ − 1) (ln εit−1 − ln εi−1) + (ln εit − ln εi) (C.16b)
x̃it ≡ (ln yit−1,xit) (C.16c)
xit ≡ (xi1t, xi2t, ..., xiJt)
= (θ − 1)git−1 + git (C.16d)
xijt ≡ (θ − 1) ln gijt−1 + ln gijt (C.16e)
git ≡ (ln gi1t, ln gi2t, ..., ln giJt) (C.16f)
λ̃ ≡ (γ, λ1, λ2, ..., λJ)′ (C.16g)
bit = (ln yit−1 − ln yi−1, xi1t − xi1, ..., xiJt − xiJ)
≡ (bi0t, bi1t, ..., biJt) (C.16h)





















































. . ... .




and, considering that xijt are exogenous and thus E [xijtvit] = 0, we can simplify the
last term in (C.18) as,
E [b
′
itvit] = (θ − 1) cov (ln yit−1, ln εit−1)p (C.19)
where p ≡ (1,0)′ and 0 is 1× J zero vector.









p(θ − 1)υ2 (C.20)
since, from Appendix B, cov (ln yit−1, ln εit−1) = υ2.
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